A r t i c l e s P an Hannian (1906 Hannian ( -1977 became a militant Communist in 1925, with remarkable talents as an organiser, diplomat, and communicator. He was put in charge of some highly specific missions by the Party: organising the League of Left-Wing Writers, negotiating with warlords or the Nationalist regime, directing intelligence operations or rallying democratic personalities to the new Communist regime. He held the prestigious post of deputy mayor of Shanghai from May 1949 until April 1955, when suddenly he became caught up in a top-level power struggle in the Communist regime in what became known as the "Gao Gang-Rao Shushi" affair.
(2) Pan and his boss, the Shanghai Party secretary Rao Shushi, along with Yang Fan, the chief of Shanghai police from 1949 to 1951, were accused of having shielded a large number of the former regime's secret agents and of having caused serious damage to the people's interests. Pan's reputation was further sullied by the revelation of a clandestine meeting in 1943, while he was a Communist Party secret agent, with Wang Jingwei, who headed a puppet regime of the Japanese at that time. Charged with treachery (neijian), counter-revolutionary acts (fangeming) and collaborating with the Kuomintang (KMT -tewu), he spent the rest of his life, from 1955 until 1977, between prison and laogai camps (the Chinese gulag). His wife, Dong Hui (1918 Hui ( -1979 , also a former Communist secret agent, suffered the same fate and died, like him, in a camp in Hunan. In 1982, the Party absolved Pan of all charges, rehabilitating him and his wife posthumously. Their remains were reburied in Beijing's Babaoshan Cemetery, which is reserved for revolutionary heroes and high-ranking Communist cadres.
Pan was quickly raised to legendary hero status. The charges against him (and Yang Fan) are now regarded as having been part of the first unjust political trial (yuan'an) of the People's Republic. Over the past two decades, articles and commemorative publications have proliferated, as have fictionalised biographies.
(3) China Central Television marked Pan's birth centenary with a 30-episode serial focusing on his life and exploits. Independent of the public's interest in it, the eulogising of Pan met the needs of a post-Maoist restoration of normality within the Party. Archives relating to the Pan case have never been opened to outside researchers, although a few official researchers have had some restricted access, as for instance Yin Qi, author of a richly documented biography. (4) Other writers were able to get their hands on pre-1949 Party archives, which are often less sensitive, (5) and draw upon the now republished writings of Pan.
(6) Sources relating to the Gao-Rao affair -Mao's speeches, senior leaders' statements, as well as accounts by former colleagues of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi (7) -have helped penetrate the secrets surrounding the charges laid against Pan by revealing the political nature of the inquisitorial trials of the period and by clarifying Mao's crucial role in organising them. Many biographers and observers believe the suit against Pan stemmed from leftist ideology and Mao's arbitrary authoritarianism. But this interpretation fails to explain why the Gao-Rao affair suddenly flared in intensity towards late March 1955 , given that the Politburo had until then been restrained in punishing Rao Shushi. (8) His sudden arrest on 1 April 1955 marked a turn for the worse in his case: his mistakes vis-à-vis the Party had become a counter-revolutionary crime. Just two days later, Pan's indictment was decided with no preliminary investigation whatsoever. One might well wonder whether the action against the two men had other political motivations and whether Pan's arrest was really meant above all to point to the existence of a so-called counter-revolutionary clique within the Party. It will not be possible to know with certainty so long as researchers remain locked out of the Party archives. Based on a number of currently available sources, this article seeks to shed some light on Pan -the man, his place in history, and his mysterious trial.
A y oung c om muni st schol ar i n S ha ng ha i
Pan Hannian was born on 12 January 1906 in a village in Yixing County to the west of Taihu Lake in the Yangzi River delta. It was one of the richest regions in imperial China, noted not only for the abundance of its farm produce and pottery but also for the number of its renowned literary figures, members of the select band of imperial examination graduates. For generations, the Pan family had been made up of scholar-peasants focusing on teaching, tending to the family lands, and raising silkworms. The young Pan Hannian attended new schools in his village and then in the city but was unable to complete his secondary studies due to his family's declining finances. Growing up at the time of the New Culture movement and the vernacular language move- Renmin chubanshe, 1996. Yin says in a postscript in his book that he was able to consult a number of closed archives and documents with the help of senior public security ministry (Gonganbu) officials. Few copies were printed of the book's first version, which appeared in 1991, and it circulated within limited politico-legal (zhengfa xitong) circles. Updated and completed with the help of new material, the 1996 version won the right to unrestricted circulation. Yin Qi also helped edit the CCTV film on Pan. china perspectives ment (baihua yundong), (9) he devoured the rich literary crop that abounded in the early 1920s. He devoted himself to literary creation, sending poems as well as short essays discussing problems in education and other social phenomena to Shanghai publications. In 1925, aged 19, Pan went to work in Shanghai. With help from a fellow Yixing resident, he found a job as a proof-reader and then editorial assistant with China Publishing House (Zhonghua shuju), which together with Shangwu (Shanghai Commercial Press) controlled the country's textbook market. The two publishers also put out several magazines aimed at educated urban readers and had an editorial stable made up of writers, journalists, intellectuals, and academics. Pan excelled at editing work, basking in the company of writers and sharing his passions with a group of young literature enthusiasts who like him were admirers of the Chuangzaoshe or Creation Society led by Guo Moruo, Yue Dafu, and Cheng Fangwu. Young Pan and his friends violently attacked all the societal evils: political corruption, warlords' arrogance, big power imperialism, and the elites' ambivalent cynicism. Pan liked to provoke, coming up with eccentric proposals hardly suited to the old order. Many of his friends from that time could hardly have imagined that this "little Pan, so laid back and free as a bird, could one day become a major secret agent for the Party." (10) The Shanghai of the mid-1920s bustled with diverse ideological currents, all sorts of political parties cohabiting and competing. The young Pan joined the Nationalists (Kuomintang, KMT) and then the Communists, allies in a Comintern-backed "united front." After throwing himself into all sorts of propaganda work, he went to the revolutionary bastions of Wuhan and Nanchang during the winter of 1926-1927 to help bring out a small publication aimed at raising soldiers' political consciousness. But the united front collapsed in July 1927. Pan left the Nationalist army and resumed his literary activities in Shanghai's concessions, alongside his friends and innumerable political refugees, militant leftists, writers, or intellectuals seeking to shelter from the White Terror.
The periodical
(11) The young activists, especially former students in Japan belonging to the literary groups Chuangzaoshe and Taiyangshe (Sun Society), continued to drum up revolutionary zeal and to fulminate against the treachery and cowardice of their former allies. In 1928 and 1929, they initiated a debate on the future of proletarian revolutionary literature, hitting out at the "bourgeois sentimentalism and conservatism" of literary forebears such as Lu Xun, Yue Dafu, and Mao Dun. The Communist Party was then resurfacing gradually and rebuilding its destroyed networks. In mid-1929, it sought to intervene in the fratricidal quarrels in writers' circles. Pan was called upon to lead a Party cultural work committee. His brief was to put an end to polemics and arrange for reconciliation between Lu Xun and other writers. The success of this mission led to the formation in Shanghai on 1 March 1930 of a league of Chinese leftist writers, bringing together Lu Xun and his former adversaries. Pan played a major role in this owing to his talents as an orator and his eclectic spirit. The writers' league led to a series of literary and artistic groupings (social sciences, film, theatre, music, and so on), which undeniably contributed to Shanghai's cultural effervescence in the 1930s. Their success was facilitated by the emergence of new urban public spaces thanks to the aggravation of the Japanese threat since 1931-1932. Party cultural work authorities such as Pan Hannian, Feng Xuefeng, and Xia Yan, seized the initiative in the domain of artistic creation and social contact.
(12) Pan was especially active in the matter of communication and building links. "He liked visiting people with differing opinions, frequenting the most varied social milieu, so as to gather information he needed and gauge the real situation in society then." (13) He seemed more and more at ease in the changing and open environment of the big city. He spoke the Shanghai dialect, often wore Western-style clothing, and sported gold-rimmed spectacles. He was ever smiling, amiable, and loquacious in the company of his friends. Perhaps the only dark cloud was his unhappy family life, thanks to a marriage his parents had arranged. But Pan would cherish a life-long affinity with this world of the 1920-1930 Shanghai circles he frequented. Some of those friends stayed loyal to him, despite his indictment as a traitor.
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N o 2 0 1 0 / 4 He ran the intelligence service and was in charge of keeping in touch with those who had infiltrated the Nanjing regime's intelligence service, rebuilding dismantled networks and sometimes warning Party cadres facing danger. 14. The full name of Teke was "Special Work Committee of the CCP Central Military Commission." It had four services under it: 1) the administration, which oversaw the finances, logistics, and the daily life of the Party's top leaders; 2) the "Red Squads" (Hongdui) -also called "the dog-hunters' brigade" -whose task was to summarily execute Communist traitors; 3) the intelligence service, which gathered information and supervised the infiltration of agents into the Nationalists' police and special services; 4) the communication service, which ensured radio contacts among the four services, between Shanghai and rural-based Communist guerrillas, and between the CCP and the Comintern. On the activities of Teke, see: Faligot Roger and Rémi Kauffer, Kang Sheng et les services secrets chinois De pl oym e nt o f the U nite d Fr ont d uring the S i no-Ja pa nes e Wa r
The second united front gave the CCP much elbow room, which, among other things, helped it open representative units in major cities in the name of "Office of the Eighth Route Army" (as the Red Army was now called). From July 1937 until early 1938, Pan took part successively in heading the "Eighth Route Army Office" in Shanghai, then in Hong Kong. In Shanghai, his mission was to receive and reassign released Communist prisoners, promote social ties under the garb of patriotism in the city, and supervise publication of a daily called Jiuwang ribao (National Salvation), which helped the Party reach out to several democratic personages, (20) writers, journalists, and intellectuals. Between August and November 1937, Pan himself wrote some 20 articles in the daily advancing Communist positions in the Anti-Japanese resistance and in the quest for potential alliances. After Japan overran Shanghai, the daily was published from Guangzhou and then Guilin in Guangxi. On Zhou Enlai's orders, Pan personally arranged the evacuation of the democratic personages and hundreds of sympathetic intellectuals to Hong Kong, Guangzhou, Guilin, and Chongqing. He also organised groups of artists and writers and divided them among military units. (22) Using their contacts among the overseas Chinese and KMT Leftists as well as other social networks, Pan and Liao sought to boost the CCP's profile and that of its armed forces, raise funds and resources, and gather all sorts of intelligence. From 29 September to 6 November 1938, Pan took part in the 6 th plenum in Yan'an of the Sixth Party Congress, which was meant to settle the differences between Mao's central team in Shaanbei and the Wang Ming-led representation in Wuhan. With unequivocal backing from Moscow, Mao's leadership prevailed, and Yan'an restored its representation structures in non-Communist zones. The old security and intelligence services were also overhauled and regrouped under a department of social affairs (Shehuibu) led by Kang Sheng, Li Kenong, and Pan Hannian. Pan focused mostly on training action units and secret agents, some of whom later followed him to Hong Kong and Shanghai.
(23) There he met a student, Dong Hui, 12 years his junior and from a family of Hong Kong bankers. She went on to join his intelligence unit and later became his second wife.
Pan-Liao in 1938 at Hong Kong, Pan Hannian is the first from the left on the second line. Liao is the first (with a child) from the right on the first line.
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the Soviet intelligence office for the Far East, the international research institute -a front for Juntong (the reporting committee of the Nationalist army), which was Chiang Kai-shek's most powerful secret service -and the private cabinet of prime minister Kong Xiangxi (H.H. Kong). From September 1939, Pan strengthened his network (known as Pan xitong) from Hong Kong to Shanghai. He placed a Communist-Nationalist double agent from Juntong, Yuan Shu, in the "Iwai Intelligence Agency," which was a branch of the Japanese foreign ministry's intelligence system in China, headed by Eiichi Iwai, Japan's vice-consul general in Shanghai. Pan met him in November and entered into an agreement according to which Iwai subsidised a politically neutral periodical known as Ershi shiji (Twentieth century) that Pan was putting out from Hong Kong. In exchange Pan's group provided Iwai's intelligence agency once a fortnight with intelligence gathered and selected by the Hong Kong CCP. It was mostly strategic information on politics in the interior of China, and governmental relations with the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and Germany. (25) (26) whose Shanghai headquarters was often referred to by its address, "76 Jessfield Road." (27) Li had been a secret CCP agent, and had then worked for the KMT Central Club faction's intelligence service and for the Japanese in 1938. He later rose rapidly in the puppet regime of Wang Jingwei, and to keep an exit option open, he secretly offered his services to the CCP as well. On Yan'an's orders, Pan placed a spy in his entourage right from 1939. The two men were in direct contact from 1942, after Li Shiqun was made governor of Jiangsu and given charge of rural pacification. He provided Pan with useful information on the rural clean-up campaign (qingxiang) covering the headquarters of the new CCP Fourth Army in the north of Jiangsu. Li introduced Pan to "76 Jessfield Road" and put him in touch with Zhou Fohai, the other service chief who maintained links with the Nationalists' Juntong. Li Shiqun designated his assistant Hu Junhe, another former Communist agent, to serve as go-between for contacts with Pan. In November 1942, these collaborators with the Japanese extended protection to Pan and other clandestine CCP leaders during their retreat from Shanghai to the Communist base of Huainan (in the south of Anhui). Many secret channels linked the two places. All these activities were approved by the central leadership in Yan'an and reported in detail to the department of social affairs. (29) Pan seems to have failed to use the opportunity to mention his meeting with Wang Jingwei and explain the circumstances in which it took place.
(30) It was hardly surprising as Pan, known to be cautious and used to work under perilous conditions, failed to cover his back.
At the p e ak of hi s c ar e er
Soon after Japan's surrender in April 1946, Pan returned to Shanghai, and later to Hong Kong, to direct united front work and the intelligence service. As a Cantonese speaker, he felt at home there. He excelled in tapping all manner of contacts to gather information, run a pro-Communist press, and protect the CCP's potential allies. From 1947, he was mainly concerned with meeting, in the free Hong Kong surroundings, all sorts of people -democratic or politically neutral -who were fleeing KMT regime reprisals. He helped them settle in, set up representative organs, and enabled them to publish. When needed, he helped reunite families or overcome financial difficulties. In the spring of 1948, the CCP appealed to other groups to take part in a consultative conference in order to form a coalition government. For one whole year, Pan was given charge of supervising the movement between Hong Kong and the Communist bases in the north and northeast of those who rallied to the CCP's side. Despite the efforts of KMT agents and British authorities' surveillance, some 350 people reached the Communist zones.
(31) When Communist victory loomed in late 1948, Pan became the most sought-after person. Everyone flocked to him for information or to forge relations. Pan also played a major role in rallying Nationalist institutions to the new regime. After the fall of Shanghai in April 1949, Pan was named deputy mayor, mainly dealing with security and united front work. He put his energies into restoring social order in a city gripped by hyperinflation, combating crime, and supervising a campaign to snuff out opponents linked to the old regime.
(32) On his instructions Shanghai police chief Yang Fan used a number of double agents or turncoats, infiltrated the KMT's clandestine radio stations and appointed Hu Junhe, former Wang Jingwei regime agent, as the head of an intelligence committee. Such obviously delicate use of some double agents led to a few incidents. In late 1951, a public security ministry investigation concluded that Shanghai police had made serious mistakes because of insufficient control over special agents and counter-revolutionary agents. Yang Fan was dismissed, but his immediate bosses -Pan Hannian and Rao Shushi -escaped inquiry at that time. (1953) (1954) (1955) committee, Hu Junhe continued to work for the Shanghai police until his sudden arrest in September 1954.
Pan was also concerned with united front work, which consisted of coordinating relations between the CCP and various socio-professional circles, especially capitalist entrepreneurs who retained a preponderant position in Shanghai society. The authorities acutely needed their cooperation in restoring economic order following the devastation of the civil war and consequent galloping inflation. Pan sought to allay the suspicions of the industrialists and financiers as regards the Communist government's capacity, and helped them restore production by solving their difficulties over funding, raw material, transport, or social conflicts. In the latter half of 1952, Pan oversaw a Beijing-ordered "Five-Anti" campaign against capitalists, but tried to tone down its more inhuman aspects in order to spare adverse effects on the economy. When Beijing decided to nationalise private enterprises, he urged those in charge of the economy to spare a few so as not to scare Chinese capitalists overseas.
As mayor Chen Yi was often tied up with his responsibilities over the eastern military region, Pan had to look after the day-to-day work of the municipality. He had to receive and accompany foreign and Chinese dignitaries visiting Shanghai, preside over public meetings, lead mass mobilisation campaigns, and initiate municipal construction. He renewed contact with his writer friends. "The Pan household," recalled friend and colleague Zhao Xian, "was always filled with people during the weekends and holidays. There were old acquaintances and friends from literary and artistic circles, democratic personalities, or those who had worked under him. People spoke without reserve and Pan got much information." (36) He was always well turned out, bore himself with elegance, and smoked English cigarettes his wife's Hong Kong family supplied. In fact, Zhao Xian was concerned about him during the Three-Anti campaign in early 1952, fearing that Pan could attract public criticism over corrupt thinking and bourgeois lifestyle.
T he G a o-Ra o af f a ir a nd p ow e r s trug g l e a t the top
The Gao-Rao affair came at a time of structural overhaul of state and Party institutions and preparations for the Eighth Party Congress. During the winter of 1952-1953, many regional leaders were called to Beijing in order to strengthen central organs and prepare for implementation of the first five-year plan. Among them were Gao Gang, Rao Shushi, Deng Xiaoping, Deng Zihui, and Xi Zhongxun. Gao went on to preside over the planning commission; Rao was asked to head the Party's organisation department and the government's labour department. After a reshuffle in the government, there was to have been one in the CCP Central Committee and Politburo, the two supreme organs that emerged from the Seventh Party Congress at Yan'an in 1945. Now Mao had differences over several issues with some leaders, especially Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai. They shared the same objectives of socialist transformation of the economy and Chinese society, but did not always agree on the methods and timetable for application of their programme, as for instance the details of farm collectivisation, policies towards the market, retention of private property, and so on. Gao Gang often shared Mao's position, favouring a voluntarist policy to prioritise the state and collective sectors of the economy. In early 1953, Mao used the problems encountered in applying the new fiscal system to severely reprimand the government for having strayed from Party directives. (37) This led to Premier Zhou Enlai abandoning the Party coordination structure (dangzu gangshihui) and letting sectoral components report directly to the Politburo or, in other words, Mao. Zhou's real powers were thus significantly reduced. He was confined to foreign affairs, whereas Gao Gang was allowed to oversee eight industry-related ministries thanks to his chairmanship of the planning commission. (38) In the ensuing months, Mao set about systematically cracking down on "Rightist tendencies" among his Politburo colleagues Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and the Rural Works Department head Deng Zihu, who advocated "the need to consolidate the new democratic order" (gonggu xinminzhu zhuyi zhixu), preservation of the "four great freedoms" (sida ziyou), and "real protection for private property" (quebao siyou caichan). During a conference on finance and econ- 37. The new fiscal system unified various existing taxes and established a principle of equality between public and private firms in tax matters. But Mao saw it as an error of "Right opportunism" (youqing jihui zhuyi) and "dispersionism" (fensan zhuyi). (39) It was in this context that Gao Gang unleashed a thinly-veiled attack on Liu Shaoqi, stressing his divergences with Mao with regard to development of agricultural cooperatives, policies towards capitalists, and other matters. The meeting turned into a venue for settling scores and lasted many weeks, Mao having let the ambiance become vitiated. Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai also had to make self-criticisms, while Gao became close to Rao Shushi, who questioned the authority of Liu's associates in the Party's Organisation Department. Gao then went on a tour of the provinces in order to recruit potential allies among Politburo members and regional civil and military leaders. He accused Liu Shaoqi and his North China Bureau (Huabeiju) entourage of having monopolised central power. Gao also spread rumours that Liu had lost Mao's confidence. The situation deteriorated and Mao decided in December to jettison Gao Gang so as to safeguard existing leadership unity. During the course of 1954, Gao and Rao were accused of having built an "anti-Party alliance" to seize power. A series of meetings were held in Beijing, and then in the former jurisdictions of the duo -Manchuria and East China -to denounce their past and current mistakes and to sweep out their adverse influence in the Party and government.
Pa n a s v icti m of the G a o-Ra o af f a ir
Gao committed suicide on 17 August 1954 and Rao became the sole target of the purge. In Rao's former fiefeastern China -his critics reopened a case that had been suppressed for three years, of the use of double agents or turncoats by the Shanghai police between 1949 and 1951. At the same time, accusations against Rao Shushi escalated. In the autumn of 1954, the public security ministry officially resumed a criminal investigation. Double agent Hu Junhe and former Shanghai police chief Yang Fan were picked up and taken to Beijing. Before the Party's national conference held from 21 to 31 March 1955, the Politburo had decided to drop Rao from the Central Committee, and he was then expelled from the Party. He was arrested on 1 April for counter-revolutionary crimes in the presence of three senior leaders: Public Security Minister Luo Ruiqing and the two top leaders in charge of the eastern region, Chen Yi and Tan Zhenlin. Two days later, it was the turn of Pan Hannian to be detained in his Beijing hotel after he revealed that in 1943 he had met Wang Jingwei.
( (1953) (1954) (1955) destine Communist network. The intelligence sector faced great pressure as criticisms swirled within the Party. Disarray reigned as cadres from the ministries of public security, supervision, and state security met for a national conference. Zhou Enlai sought to reassure them while referring to the Pan Hannian affair: "What are you afraid of? It was I who knew Pan the longest and our relations were the strongest. If I don't worry about it myself, why do you?" (43) That said, Zhou quickly put together an investigation team led by general Li Kenong, who was then one of the seniormost officials in charge of civil and military intelligence. The investigators reviewed the correspondence between Pan and the central leadership from March 1939 to August 1948. At the end of three months, Li Kenong signed a detailed report on 29 July 1955 addressed to the Politburo and the Central Committee secretariat. He showed that all of Pan's activities were in line with central directives, and that he had regularly reported to central leaders, be it in respect of contacts with Japanese secret services or the use of double agents of the collaborationist regime such as Li Shiqun, Hu Junhe, and others. Li Kenong also stressed the decisive character of intelligence provided by Pan in some of the Party's decisions. He said there had never been a leak of organisational secrets until Shanghai's liberation, and that some of Pan's links continued to feed the intelligence services at the time of the investigation. He concluded by recommending prudent handling of the Pan affair. His report was sent to the leadership mentioned above but evoked no response despite three successive reminders. (44) Zhou Enlai was not alone in doubting the fairness of Mao's decision. Another Politburo member, Zhang Wentian, who had known Pan extremely well, told his wife that Pan's indictment lacked all proof and that the Politburo had never discussed it.
(45) As for Chen Yun and Liao Chengzhi, two veterans and former comrades of Pan, they were among the first, after Mao left the scene, to demand his rehabilitation despite intra-Party opposition. (46) Mao's unshaking resolve led to the total destruction of Pan Hannian and his wife, Dong Hui. In Shanghai alone, the Pan affair led to action against a thousand people, of whom 800 were arrested and condemned to jail terms; some 200 others suffered unfair treatment, which had implications for their families and descendants. Most of them were Communist cadres and agents who were part of Pan's intelligence team, KMT turncoats, contacts forged through united front work, friends, and relatives.
(47) Co nclus ion: Ma o a nd the m a na g e me nt of i ntra -P ar ty m at ter s Over the following years, Mao publicly mentioned Pan Hannian several times. Thus at the October 1955 Sixth Plenum of the Seventh Party Congress, he referred to Pan as a counter-revolutionary who had evaded the Yan'an zhengfeng (campaign to rectify the Party's working style in [1942] [1943] . Less than a year later, in his major speech "On the Ten Major Relationships," he said of the "counterrevolutionaries" Hu Feng, Pan Hannian, and Rao Shushi: "We don't have them executed, not because their crimes don't deserve capital punishment but because such executions would yield no advantage." He repeated this on 30 January 1962 at the Conference of 7,000 (qiqianren dahui), saying, with extraordinary levity, that Pan had gone over to the Kuomintang and had been an agent of the Central Club faction.
(48) The aim of the meeting he was addressing was to take stock of the catastrophic Great Leap Forward (1958 Forward ( -1961 . A question that arises is why Mao was so intent on condemning Pan, who had never taken part in the Gao-Rao manipulation and had never acted against the Communist cause or Party unity. Yan'an in 1942 Yan'an in -1943 , thousands of Communist activists and cadres suspected of being infiltrators suffered the worst persecution. This "internal" terror had the specific aim of "upholding the basic principles and disciplinary rules of the Party." This was Mao's explicit message in speaking of the lessons from the Rao Shushi-Pan Hannian affair. As per Leninist dogma, the Communist Party is the instrument of revolutionary leaders to capture power and realise their transformation projects. In order to preserve combat readiness, the troops need to be purified through regular rectification tests, combating revisionist ideas, and unmasking hidden enemies. For this, the sacrifice of some individuals would be a striking lesson to guide the Party and the masses. During the bloody campaign to eradicate counter-revolutionaries in 1951-1952, Mao had already stressed this educational dimension by speaking of imparting to the population a living lesson and powerfully buttressing the new regime's political authority. (51) Mao had greatly appreciated Pan's talent and success. But the Party no longer needed his services as much, now that it had cornered the near totality of resources in the political arena. On the other hand, the Pan Hannian affair would help Mao intimidate and bring to heel senior Party leaders. Yang Shangkun recalled that on hearing Mao's harsh words against Pan on 5 April 1955, "The atmosphere in the auditorium suddenly grew tense. Central Committee members, including myself, never expected it. We were all surprised; we never thought the Gao-Rao affair could come to this." (52) Yang noted, "Several comrades in the Party secretariat [shujichu] and Central Committee members spoke, voicing their support for the Chairman's directive to draw the whole Party's attention to the issue." (53) Is there a link between the Pan Hannian affair and the power struggles of the 1950s? Evidently, in Mao's eyes, Right opportunism was being manifested not only in the organisational domain but also in the Party's overall comportment. It should be borne in mind that the Gao-Rao manipulations started out by sowing discord between Mao and other top leaders. Mao readily drew a parallel between his concrete policy orientation and his revolutionary discourse on class struggle.
(54) With such juxtaposition, he could build up an all round dominant position -on the policy line, organisation, and theory. Despite the great prestige he enjoyed in the Party and the country, there seemed to be a certain vague competition between Liu Shaoqi and himself. Times had changed: China was no longer at war, and Mao had to more often than not measure up to his colleagues in socioeconomic and technical competence, and no longer just in military strategy. • 
